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 Outline Introduction to functional verification What is functional verification? Leading functional verification techniques 	
 The SoC challenge What's new in SoC design? Why is verification difficult for SoCs? 	
 Possible solutions Raise the abstraction level Test generation examples 	
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Checl	king Techniques (2)
♦ Ass	ertions (or properties checking)
۲	Starting from simple assert statements
	\diamond assert (length > 0)reprot "Illegal Length"
۲	Assertions can be manually inserted by the designer into the source code of the design, or they can be externally created and inserted by verification tools
۲	Current assertion techniques use temporal property specification languages to specify complex assertions
⊗ Beh	avioral rules
*	Rules that describe the expected behavior of the design
۲	Usually rules are more abstract than assertions Not limited to specific facilities
۲	Example: scoreboard
	Check that everything that goes in also comes out
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Heavy Use of Cores		
 Core are more reliable than cust They have been used and to 	om logic ested before	
Unit (core) verification may not b	e necessary	
 Cores are often black boxes Hard to look inside 		
The cores may not be verified fo	r the specific use scenario o	f the system
Simulation model of the cores m	ay not be available	
Bebugging is much harder		
 Is the bug in the core or the How do we debug the interr 	interface? als of the core?	
 Integration is more difficult 		
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 Checking Techniques for SoC Verification Golden model / expected results Results are hard to predict because of parallel nature of systems Possible solutions: Cycle-accurate golden model 	
 Ignore ordering Needed assertions On the interfaces to detect protocol violations Should be provided by the developers of the cores Transaction level assertions New assertion language with transaction vocabulary Length, fields, actors, Detection of internal transactions may be difficult 	
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Step & Ev « « « BI « « «	 1 – Model the System erything is modeled as an HFSM Global HFSM for configuration and test specification Environment HFSM for allowing only legal inputs One HFSM per IP ack box model of the IPs Abstract away the data computation performed in the IP Model configuration and interactions with other IPs Interactions are modeled at the transaction level Outputs are symbolic commands of the IP Inputs are arbitrary Whatever is convenient to drive the tests 	
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