


Future Memory Trend

- Challenges in scaling conventional DRAM and Flash below 40nm
- New “storage-class memory” is emerging
- Desirable features of SCM
 - Non-volatility (like storage)
 - Solid-state, no mechanical ops (like memory)
 - High density (like storage)
 - High-performance (like memory)
 - Scalable with feature size shrink
 - Low cost (everyone likes money)

So Many Memories, So Many Hierarchy

Memory Type	DRAM	6T SRAM	NOR FLASH	PCM	MRAM	STT-RAM	FeRAM	Memristor
Volatility	Volatile	Volatile	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM
Cell Size (F ²)	6 - 12	50 - 80	7 - 11	5 - 8	16-40	6-20	15	scalable
Read	Destructive	Partial Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Destructive	Non-Destructive
Erase Granularity	Direct	Direct	Block	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct
Write/Erase/Read Time	50ns/50ns/50ns	8ns/8ns/8ns	1μs/1-100ms/60ns	10ns/50ns/20ns	30ns/30ns/30ns	20ns/20ns/20ns	80ns/80ns/43ns	1-10us/100us
Programming Energy	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low?
Write/Read Endurance	~∞/~∞	~∞/~∞	10 ⁶ /~∞	10 ⁸ -10 ¹² /~∞	10 ¹² /10 ¹²	10 ¹⁵ /10 ¹⁵ (?)	10 ¹² /10 ¹²	10 ⁷ /?
Multi-Level Cell	No	No	Yes	Yes	stacking	stacking	No	stacking
Cost per bit	Low	High	Medium	Low	??	??	High	??
Supply Voltage	3V	<1V	6-8V	1.5-3V	3V	1.8V	1.9V	<1.5V?




Example of Memory Hierarchy with Many Memories

- Co-optimize: density, speed, reliability, and read/write power
- Some memories can co-locate at the same level
- Probably no one-size-fits-all

3

Moving SCM Up in Memory Hierarchy

Memory Type	DRAM	6T SRAM	NOR FLASH	PCM	MRAM	STT-RAM	FeRAM	Memristor
Volatility	Volatile	Volatile	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM	NVM
Cell Size (F ²)	6 - 12	50 - 80	7 - 11	5 - 8	16-40	6-20	15	scalable
Read	Destructive	Partial Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Non-Destructive	Destructive	Non-Destructive
Erase Granularity	Direct	Direct	Block	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct
Write/Erase/Read Time	50ns/50ns/50ns	8ns/8ns/8ns	1μs/1-100ms/60ns	10ns/50ns/20ns	30ns/30ns/30ns	20ns/20ns/20ns	80ns/80ns/43ns	1-10us/100us
Programming Energy	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low?
Write/Read Endurance	~∞/~∞	~∞/~∞	10 ⁶ /~∞	10 ⁸ -10 ¹² /~∞	10 ¹² /10 ¹²	10 ¹⁵ /10 ¹⁵ (?)	10 ¹² /10 ¹²	10 ⁷ /?
Multi-Level Cell	No	No	Yes	Yes	stacking	stacking	No	stacking
Cost per bit	Low	High	Medium	Low	??	??	High	??
Supply Voltage	3V	<1V	6-8V	1.5-3V	3V	1.8V	1.9V	<1.5V?



Example of Memory Hierarchy with Many Memories


- Co-optimize: density, speed, reliability, and read/write power
- Some memories can co-locate at the same level
- Probably no one-size-fits-all

4


Take

Phase-Change Memory


as an example in this talk



PCM in Main Memory Hierarchy



Non-volatile
Bit-alterable
High density (with Multi-Level Cells)
CMOS-compatible process
Better scalability (than DRAM)



Long read/write latency
MLC read needs serial sensing
MLC write needs iterative writes
Limited write endurance

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Enhance Reliability due to Limited Endurance

• Wear Leveling

- Evenly distribute writes
- Transparent to all components



• Self-Healing

- Dealing with aging stuck-at-faults
- Continue to use memory with cells stuck-at-value
- Smart Error Recovery Mechanism



• Hybrid Hetero-Memory Architecture

- Filter out memory accesses
- Integrate with durability-proof memory (e.g., SRAM)



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I. Wear Leveling

Consider
the *worst-case* scenario
or
malicious process

Wear Leveling Design Goals

Low Cost
(No Map Table)

Dynamic
Randomization
(Covert)

Exploit Wear-out
Lifetime Limit
(Ideal wear-leveling)




Security Refresh: Dynamic Address Randomization

International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA-37)
IEEE MICRO Top Picks 2011

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
Security Refresh




(Previous) **KEY0** = 01

(Current) **KEY1** = 10


Remap Function: $MA \text{ XOR } KEY$



12




13




14

Two-Level Security Refresh



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Two-Level Security Refresh Evaluation



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II. Self-Healing

Continue to operate the memory even
when cells are *stuck-at-value*



SAFER:
Stuck-At-Fault Error Recovery

International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO-43)



SAFER:
1. Fault Separation
2. Single Error Correction

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Basic Concept of SAFER

- Multiple error correction
 - Fault separation
 - Apply Single Error Correction (SEC)


Fault Separation

SEC SEC
- Exploit properties of Stuck-At Faults
 - Permanency
 - Readability

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Fault Separation


- Assuming 2 faults in an 8-bit block
 - $C(8,2) = 28$ possible fault pairs
- How to separate these 2 faults (of all 28 pairs)?



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Decision for Fault Separation


- Find pattern candidates by **XORing** bit pointers



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Decision for Fault Separation

- Find pattern candidates by **XORing** bit pointers



23




SAFER:

1. Fault Separation
2. Single Error Correction

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Low-cost Single Error Correction


- Stuck-At Fault Property: Readability



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Low-cost Single Error Correction


- Data Inversion as an SEC



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
Hardware Overhead vs. Recoverability

- Data block size = 512 bits
- IdealECC, ECP, SAFER, SAFER_FC




Hybrid Resistive Memory

Hybrid Resistive Memory Architecture




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Multi-Dimensional Address Classification



SUMMARY



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THAT'S ALL, FOLKS!



Georgia Tech
ECE MARS Lab
<http://arch.ece.gatech.edu>

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